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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the choice of import tariffs and production 
subsidies to provide optimal protection of domestic industry in 
the presence of oligopolistic competition, provided that there is 
a difference in costs between domestic and foreign firms. We show 
that the choice of optimal protection depends both on the 
difference in firms' costs and the relative number of firms 
across countries. First, in the case that the number of foreign 
firms is larger, an optimal protection is a production subsidy, 
regardless of the difference in costs. Second, in the case that 
the number of foreign firms is equal to, or less than that of 
domestic firms, an import tariff provides optimal protection if 
the difference in costs is large, while a production subsidy 
provides optimal protection if the differece in costs is small. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a large body of research analysing optimal trade 
pol icies. It has been shown that import tariffs and import quotas 
are equivalent in the case of perfect competition. But, if there 
is distortion, e.g., imperfect competition, then the equivalence 
does not necessarily hold. For example, Helpman and Krugman 
(1989) state that an import tariff policy is superior to an 
import quota policy as a means to protect domestic industry in 
the presence of international oligopoly. As to the choice of 
optimal export policies, i.e., export taxes or export subsidies, 
extending the model of Brander and Spencer (1985) to cases of 
more than two firms, Dixit (1984) shows that an export subsidy in 
a Cournot oligopoly equilibrium is the optimal choice so long as 
the number of domestic firms is not too large. Eaton and Grossman 
(1992) prove that the choice of optimal export policies depends 
on the form of oligopolistic competition. That is, an export 
subsidy policy is an optimal under Cournot duopoly, while an 
export tax policy is an optimal under Bertrand duopoly. 
Under the GATT-WTO system, import tariffs are allowed, while 
import quotas are basically banned. A production subsidy policy 
to protect a domestic industry is not generally banned, however, 
an export subsidy policy is not allowed, and likely leads to 
retaliation, i.e., a countervailing duty policy. 
Although there are many works discussing the optimal choice of 
trade policies, there are few analysing the choice between a 
trade policy, like an import tariff, and an industrial policy, 
like a production subsidy, to protect a domestic industry. For 
example, Corden (1957) shows that the optimal protection is an 
import tariff, rather than a production subsidy in the case of a 
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